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The last ten years have been an exciting and stimulating period for scholars focused 
upon the study of civil war. Publications have grown exponentially, academic 
communities have continually expanded and civil war scholars have assumed a 
position at heart of methodological advancement within the social sciences. The three 
texts under review have been at the centre of these developments, becoming essential 
reads within the literature on violence and conflict. Undoubtedly each represents an 
ambitious and comprehensive project, constituting notable advancements to the field.  
Broadly speaking they each seek to develop our understanding of the variance in 
motivations, intensity and patterns of violence adopted by insurgent movements.  
Going beyond correlation analysis, each study represents a return to favor of case 
based work within conflict studies, combining a range of methodologies to present 
compelling accounts of the micro-foundations of violence.  
The important contribution made by each of these texts is perhaps best reflected in the 
notable number of reviews already undertaken
ii
. A wide variety of authors within a 
range of different journals have published papers assessing the achievements of each 
of the works. Indeed, Kalyvas himself wrote a lengthy, and at times pointed review of 
Weinstein’s book.iii Yet to date most reviews have focused on the undoubted 
accomplishments of the works, failing to discuss in detail some of the areas in which 
improvement remains possible.  The authors of this paper first observed this 
deficiency when we met at workshop based upon qualitative methods and the study of 
civil war, at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
iv
. In particular we noted that 
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existing methodological assessments remained far too abstract, notably failing to 
assess if the data that informed the studies was put to use accurately, or if the 
conclusions drawn from new bodies of data were as valid as the authors assumed. 
Moreover issues regarding case selection, the cause-symptom problem and tensions 
between rational choice and other modes of explanation were too often excluded from 
focus. As a result of both the discussions undertaken on the course and the subsequent 
dialogue that the authors continued, we have produced this review that we believe is 
more “micro” in its methodological critique, allowing for a more holistic evaluation 
of the strengths and weakness of the approach taken in each of these three seminal 
works.   
The paper opens with a brief section recounting those areas in which the texts have 
most notably progressed theoretical and methodological understanding within the 
discipline, before the substantive section of the paper addresses methodological issues 
within these works that have too often been overlooked.  
Civil War Theory from the Inside Out 
As the title of his text suggests, Weinstein’s work seeks to build a more substantial 
theory of civil war by going ‘inside rebellion’ to illuminate the origins and structures 
of insurgent movements. In doing so the author presents an acutely rational theory 
that views initial endowments to which rebel leaders have access as the key 
determinant of the form of organization that emerges and the strategies of violence 
they employ.   
For when a rebel force has access to lootable or otherwise easily accessible resources, 
Weinstein predicts the formation of a group characterized by low levels of 
commitment, taking fewer risks for immediate short-term gains. These groups of rebel 
‘consumers’ are for Weinstein more likely to enjoy a flood of new opportunistic 
recruits, who are more likely to undertake indiscriminate and ill disciplined forms of 
violence. Alternatively it is argued that those groups that originate in resource-poor 
environments must instead rely on their social endowments for recruitment. Thus 
resource poor groups must appeal to long-term interests, draw on norms, networks, 
and values that produce a selective pool of activist recruits. These rebel ‘investors’ 
will endure the costly investment required within warfare for the promise of future 
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payoffs. As a result a greater discipline is expected, meaning better relations with 
non-combatants should be the norm.   
On the theoretical side, by creating two mutually exclusive categorizations 
Weinstein’s theory lacks an element of dynamic appreciation. For based solely on the 
presence or absence of resource endowments, groups are categorized into mutually 
exclusive categorizations (consumers or investors). This disregards the quite probable 
eventuality that a rebel group shifts from one group to the other in the course of a 
conflict. Moreover it ignores the possibility of groups in resource poor regions 
recruiting on the basis of economic benefits, an occurrence that for example in the 
presence of external sources of income may in reality be quite likely. The use of 
coercion and abduction in recruitment is also excluded from the analysis, save a 
minor reference in a footnote. Hence the theory fails to truly appreciate the multiple 
incentives that are likely to be utilized by all rebel groups.  
In addition to this lack of dynamism, the theory attempts to hold constant both the 
state and civilian actors. In this sense the relative power of actors, or the level of 
control, is essentially ignored. Such exclusion is illogical as the collaboration or 
hostile nature of non-combatant population, and the capacity of the state to challenge 
the rebels are each likely to have some bearing on the form of violence a movement 
adopts.  
A Dynamic Analysis of Civil War  
It is this dynamic element of relative power or the variance in levels of control that 
assumes the central place in the work of Kalyvas. In this sense the author goes beyond 
the simplistic dichotomy of active combatants and passive civilians and shows how 
patterns of violence in civil war results from the interaction between combatants and 
non-combatants. The author connects three levels of analysis – interactions between 
unitary political actors; interactions between political actors and the populations under 
their control; and interactions within groups and among individuals.   
Kalyvas focuses on developing a theory of what he describes as the “deep structure” 
of violence in human conflict, one that links local experiences of violence to strategic 
goals of combatants and civilians alike, using degree of control as the key intervening 
variable. Variation in the level of violence is a non-linear function of patterns of 
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control of territory by combatants, and the shifting patterns of incentives that result 
for civilians to either defect or denounce to one warring side or another. He provides a 
sophisticated and detailed account of the mechanisms by which control and 
collaboration interact, focusing in particular on the “micro-foundational” logic linking 
violence to belligerents’ territorial control and civilians’ decisions to collaborate (or 
not) in conflict situations. In this sense Kalyvas operates from a position of “thick” 
rationality, assuming actors to act strategically in pursuit of a range of preferences 
including the acquisition of status or wealth, the increased likelihood of survival of 
selves and family members, and other similar incentives.  
However, despite the clarity of the author’s argument there are still open questions 
regarding the scope conditions of his theory. In claiming that his argument applies to 
any “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between 
parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (p. 17) Kalyvas 
may have overstated its range. For instance, as Weinstein argues, economically and 
politically motivated actors may differ in the way they behave, as a result of the 
different incentive structures upon which recruitment is based. In particular, 
individual fighters do not always comply with the commands of their immediate 
superiors in civil wars in which the organizational structures are too weak to enforce 
these rules coherently. This is a point that Kalyvas recognizes in theory, but does not 
explicitly include in his formal model and hypotheses regarding selective violence (p. 
195-204).  Rather he assumes organizations employ violence against civilians 
rationally, whether discriminately or indiscriminately, in an attempt to deter defection. 
Moreover he makes the strong assumption that command and control issues are 
insignificant in the deployment of violence against civilian populations.  Clearly, 
accounts provided by Weinstein, among others, illustrates that such is not always the 
case. This points to a potential limitation on the utility of Kalyvas’ theory, namely 
that it is less applicable to forms of conflict such as Weinstein’s “opportunistic 
rebellions”, where short-term economic gains take precedence over strategic 
objectives for combatants (p. 10).  
Collective Emotional Action  
Wood’s research is guided by the question of why, despite the extraordinarily high 
risks of doing so, non-combatants support opposition organizations (including guerilla 
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armies) when material rewards are low. This is grounded in the case of El Salvador, in 
which despite minimal material incentives, insurgents overcame ‘free rider’ problems 
to generate widespread and largely voluntary participation. Wood contends that the 
traditional (Olsonian) explanation of collective action is an inadequate approach 
through which to explain the conflict in El Salvador, for neither coercion nor selective 
material incentives can account for the behavior of insurgent campesinos.  
Instead Wood grounds her explanation of non-combatant participation upon moral 
and emotional justifications (p. 251). Rejecting the traditional confinement of such 
features to the irrational sphere, Wood argues that they were “cogent and enduring” 
reasons for rational action. Wood thereby reconceptualises the nature of incentives 
that may motivate collective action, while accepting the rational choice tenet that 
“social outcomes are the by-products of choices made by individuals.”v  
Wood’s interpretation of the collective action puzzle centers upon three main 
elements, participation, defiance, and pleasure in agency. Participation justifies non-
combatant involvement in relation to religious obligation and the struggle against 
injustice. Defiance denotes a refusal to acquiesce in the face of the state’s brutal 
reaction to the insurgency. And finally pleasure in agency refers to “the positive affect 
associated with self-determination, autonomy, self-esteem, efficacy, and pride that 
come from the successful assertion of intention” (p. 235). Pleasure in agency was a 
collective experience, a just pleasure, because the existing societal structure was seen 
as unjust.  
The pleasure in agency, it appears, is where material and non-material rewards 
intersect: the expected structural change would mean not only political recognition 
and empowerment, but also an enhanced position from which to negotiate politically 
with elites – about very material issues such as access to land. Wood readily admits 
that the demarcation line between the two is a blurred one, “...despite my emphasis on 
the emotional and moral reasons for acting, aspirations for land did play an important 
role” (p. 236). But she goes on to stress that land occupation was “a moral and 
political claim” and not a productive or legal one (p. 236). 
While Wood, like Kalyvas, acknowledges the validity and efficacy of the other’s 
approach, neither attempt to incorporate the others insights in their own theoretical 
account.  In doing so, their work represents a turn away from efforts in the previous 
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decade to achieve what one might call a “grand unified theory” of conflict research.  
Rather than evaluating the relative explanatory power of theoretically distinct 
explanations such as “greed” and “grievance”, both prefer to bracket out elements 
inconsistent with their analytical framework, maintaining analytical consistency at the 
expense of explanatory completeness. In different ways both authors provide 
compelling examples of question-driven research. 
Despite the strength of argument within Wood’s text, a number of aspects of the 
social context of the civil war have been excluded. Wood argues that there was 
widespread support for the insurgency in her case-study areas, yet she leaves the 
relationship between insurgent and non-insurgent campesinos largely unexplored. 
Given the widespread grassroots support, it is likely that non-material rewards could 
be significant to those who did participate and their kin. While it is a daunting task to 
disentangle intention and effect, the social rewards for participation are not explored 
sufficiently in Wood’s rational actor perspective. As such, the account does not 
connect the micro-foundations of civil war with the macro-level: There is no meso-
level analysis of the social contexts provided by neighborhoods, villages, families, 
etc. Given Wood’s extensive fieldwork, one may assume that a great deal of rich, 
empirical data has not been incorporated into the analysis. 
Furthermore Wood finds, through her interview data, that “the growth of political 
organizations before the war depended significantly on the ideological work of 
liberation theology” (p. 119). Liberation theology is accordingly quite central to the 
motivational forces of participation and defiance, and thus appears to be an important 
ideational antecedent variable. Like liberation theology, moral and emotional reasons 
are difficult to understand independent of their wider social context. Wood analyses 
the historical and the material context, mainly with regard to land issues, but her 
interpretation of the social universe is incomplete.  
This feeds into a related point, the absence of regional context.  Would it not be 
fruitful to conceptualize the Salvadorean uprising against the backdrop of regional 
ideological currents? These ran through large parts of Central America in the 1970s 
and 1980s, affecting several of El Salvador’s neighboring countries. An analysis of 
such factors would have strengthened Wood’s analytic narrative, but regional, 
political context is almost fully neglected in Wood’s analytic narrative.   
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The Method of Entering Rebellion 
In terms of methodology, Weinstein’s book can be divided in two parts: one 
qualitative small-N and the other a quantitative large-N study. Chapters two through 
seven investigate the structure and strategies of four rebel movements in three 
countries, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, the Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, and the Shining Path National and the 
Shining Path Huallaga in Peru, through in-depth case analyses. After first theorizing 
on five aspects of rebel groups’ structure and strategies, Weinstein then underpins his 
theory by selected empirical examples from the abovementioned cases. The 
theoretical elements of the book draw inspiration from a myriad of prominent 
scholars. The empirical evidence is based on Weinstein’s own collection of nearly 
200 interviews with combatants and civilians related to the four insurgent movements 
mentioned above. Access to these informants was made possible through national 
elites and local leaders. 
In the latter part of the investigation, chapters eight and nine attempt to expand the 
argument to a larger set of cases, mainly by using regression analyses. By employing 
a dependent variable measuring combat related deaths, Weinstein finds that rebels’ 
access to material resources greatly increases the bloodiness of the rebellion. Through 
a second regression, Weinstein finds that resource wealth increases the number of 
rebel groups engaged in civil wars, and that the number of rebel groups is negatively 
correlated to strong states. 
By focusing upon the organizational structure of rebel groups, essentially going 
‘inside rebellion’, Weinstein has undoubtedly produced a largely original argument 
and a fine body of new interview data. Yet in search of methodological variety, the 
author has failed to overcome a number of notable shortcomings.  
More serious than the issues associated with the overly parsimonious theory discussed 
above, the methodological inadequacies unfortunately detract from the text. Most 
serious of these is the significant ground attempted to cover by the book. Theorizing 
on the micro-foundations of rebellion while at the same time trying to create macro-
evidence for his argument, Weinstein leaves the reader short of breath in trying to 
follow the massive implications of his methods. Instead of aiming to uncover the 
multiple mechanisms linking micro incentives to macro patterns, Weinstein should 
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have stayed inside rebellion. Addressing the lack of theory on causal links in civil war 
research is the book’s best feature, but rather than actually building a theory, the 
author goes beyond the micro incentives of rebellion when presenting underdeveloped 
regression tables. Large-N correlations with causal value can only be potentially 
identified in regressions posing several potential explanations in one model. The lack 
of sufficient statistical controls, the use of questionable proxy measures
vi
, and unclear 
causal direction does not move the argument beyond the four case studies. 
With regards to the qualitative research the author’s choice of cases further damages 
the methodological rigor of the text. While it appears the author based selection upon 
Mill’s method of difference, matching cases that were similar in most respects but 
differing on the dependent variable, little explanation as to why these states are 
similarly matched is provided. Given the huge variety of state capacity measures that 
could have been considered this seriously detracts from the transparency of the work. 
In this sense the reader is left with a lingering suspicion that selection bias is at play, a 
concern not reduced by the impressive theoretical fit and convenient linguistic overlap 
between Weinstein and the cases.  
A final confusing feature of this book is Weinstein’s own labeling of his methods. In 
the first chapter the author sets out an impressive research design, promising both 
“micro-comparative” and “ethnographic” work, in addition to application of process 
tracing. Though there are elements of these techniques and methods in this book, 
Inside Rebellion rests first and foremost on the method of classical in-depth case 
investigation. Given the relatively short period spend within the field, it is unlikely 
that Weinstein and his assistants were able to generate the depth of analysis required 
for the ethnographic method.
vii
 Moreover Weinstein appears to have viewed 
interviewees as observations requiring coding, rather than as informants. Thus rather 
than seek to uncover a wider focus on the construction of the social reality in which 
these cases exist, subjects’ complete stories were searched for commonalities and 
differences, a more rigid style of data collection which seems to fall short of the 
ethnographic threshold of immersion
viii
. Disappointingly, by adopting this approach 
the author missed an opportunity to generate a large body of meta-data, that may have 




Similarly while there are elements of process tracing in Weinstein’s book, the lack of 
sufficient exploration into the existence of alternative intervening causal mechanisms, 
suggests that it cannot truly be considered to be process tracing at the core.
x
 Moreover 
the ethnographic claims that the author presents do not sit well with process tracing 
method unless one attempts to bridge different philosophies of social science that 
underpin these divergent methods. This confusion seems to highlight the great need 
for a definitive or instructional text on the topic of process tracing, so as to generate a 
consistent appreciation as to how this method should best be adopted.  
All in all Inside Rebellion is an excellent example of large-scale field research.  As 
such, it could have been a book presenting brand new theories on the micro-incentives 
of rebellion – theories that could have paved the way for groundbreaking studies 
attempting to open the “black box” of causal mechanisms in armed conflict. Yet while 
methodologically the book retains some impressive features, it eventually comes up 
short on account of the scale of the task that was adopted. Had Weinstein chosen to 
focus upon the books strengths and remove inapplicable labels and underdeveloped 
statistics, its weaknesses could have been effectively addressed without losing any of 
the core contributions to knowledge that the author effectively makes.   
Capturing Dynamics 
In comparison Kalyvas maintains a close match between his analytical assumptions 
and his methodological choices, with the former consistently driving the latter.  In this 
regard, his work provides an interesting – and highly complementary – counterpoint 
to that of Wood, who remains similarly disciplined in her alignment of theory and 
methodology. The multiple methods that Kalyvas adopts – from large-N quantitative, 
to geospatial representations, comparative historical analysis, archival study and 
interviews in the field – are each brought to bear on a single theoretically consistent 
project. The choice and application of methods follow from the questions asked and 
the epistemological and ontological assumptions employed, and not vice versa. 
In addition, Kalyvas frankly acknowledges the methodological difficulties entailed in 
studying certain phenomena (e.g. civilian support by looking at allegiance). By 
directly addressing, rather than concealing, the difficulties in linking theory to 
empirics, Kalyvas opens a dialogue with other scholars and allows readers to consider 
ways of overcoming such research obstacles. Towards that end, in presenting the 
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empirical support for his theoretical account, Kalyvas spends a significant amount of 
time on mis-predictions, villages in which the level and type of violence did not 
accord with his expectations. The field would be well served if all academics adopted 
such an openly self-critical approach. 
The text is not without issue, however. Methodologically the biggest challenge for 
Kalyvas is how to conceptualize and measure control. He defines it as the extent to 
which forces of either side can move freely in a given area, and rates each village 
along a five-point scale, from sole control by incumbents (1), to sole control by 
insurgents (5) (p. 421). His primary sources of information on the military movements 
and patrol schemes include regional court records and military records from Greek, 
British and German authorities (p. 393). This creates problems on two fronts. First, 
these sources of data would tend have a great deal of information regarding the 
incumbents, but presumably do not have as much relevant information on insurgent 
movements given that the latter are almost by definition clandestine.
xi
 Second, the 
data have been collected by one of the parties to the conflict. Due to the strategic 
nature of human interactions in a civil war context, it is likely that the insurgents and 
other social actors worked to conceal their true actions, and tried to feed the 
incumbent side false information to obtain an advantage. Given the strong constraints 
on the collection and verification of information on insurgents for the authors of such 
sources, there is a positive likelihood that the written record includes false and/or 
misinterpreted data. The use of British records in addition to German and official 
Greek sources mitigates, but does not fully rectify the problem. 
Accordingly, to address such issues Kalyvas goes one step further and employs a 
method of triangulation, cross-checking the official written sources against local 
written and oral histories, including an extensive series of interviews he conducted in 
the relevant regions of Greece. Naturally, there are numerous potential pitfalls in 
using such data as well – particularly with the passage of considerable time since the 
events took place – but Kalyvas is admirably sensitive to such considerations (p. 395-
411).  His 215 interviewees can be classified by political affiliation, which allowed 
Kalyvas to oversample partisans of the insurgency.
xii
 The distribution of interviewees 
seems to provide Kalyvas with some leverage to correct for biases in his written 
sources through a stronger representation of insurgent activists among respondents. 
This presumably provides him with better information on the insurgent’s side and 
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their capacity to exercise military control. Taken alone, the insurgent interviews could 
have introduced a bias as well, but in combination with the written sources and the 
small number of interviews with people from the incumbent’s side, Kalyvas has found 
a good way of triangulating his data sources. Admittedly, to the extent that oral and 
written histories (and the qualitative and quantitative databases constructed from 
them) incorporate the same sources of bias – whether as a result of shared culture or 
some other difficult-to-control source of bias – corroboration of the findings of one 
method by another may actually reinforce or even magnify the ensuing distortion. 
Kalyvas’ solution to this latter problem is to provide numerous collaborative 
anecdotes from the broader literature illustrating similar results in other contexts. 
Such evidence is obviously not definitive, but it is likely the only approach possible 
within the context of a single in-depth case study. 
Encapsulating Emotions 
Unlike Kalyvas, Wood’s single case study does not include comparative material 
although she believes that her findings are relevant to other cases with the same scope 
conditions: “where poor people are excluded from social and political participation, 
where an emerging social movement challenges that exclusion and makes claims on 
the state and the well-to-do, and where the response of the state is repression rather 
than accommodation” (xii-xiii). As these conditions were present in many Latin 
American countries, comparative material from the region may have added causal 
leverage. If it is true that participation, defiance, and pleasure in agency were the main 
drivers behind the insurgency, Wood’s findings might have been corroborated by 
including the regional grassroots resistance movements that played such a major part 
in Central America at the time, presumably creating a sense of collective purpose that 
was not only larger than the individual, but larger than the individual state as well. 
 
Wood’s research is based chiefly on her interview data and maps of the case study 
areas drawn collaboratively by 12 teams of campesinos; both are triangulated by 
means of a variety of written sources, from human rights report to household surveys. 
Of the 200 campesinos interviewed by Wood, only 24 were non-participants in the 
insurgency. This might be an effect of her 'snowballing' sampling method, which was 
imperative to obtain access to her interviewees in the context of civil war. But it does 
introduce an element of selection bias into her findings, which is reflected in her focus 
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on reasons for participation rather than non-participation. In this sense perhaps her 
research would have benefited from theoretical sampling for the reasons for non-
participation. It provides for a neat argument that non-participants held the old 
political culture, while participants developed a new political culture, expressed as 
participation, defiance and pleasure in agency. Yet interview data that shows the 
absence of such sentiments among non-participants would have strengthened the 
argument. 
 
In addition to interviews, another important source of data in Wood's book stems from 
the map-making research. This method involved Wood asking insurgent campesinos 
to take part in map-making workshops in order to draw maps of their cooperative's 
property boundaries during the course of the conflict. Both highly innovative and a 
very apt methodological tool, this provided important insights into the social and 
ideological aspect of the insurgency. The maps, proud testaments to collective agency 
and achievements, became “ideological constructions, acts of critical remembrance 
and redemption as well as an assertion of power to claim and hold land” (p.218). 
 
Having read the formal model in the book’s appendix, however, one may be forgiven 
for doubting that emotions of pride and empowerment, tantalizingly well captured in 
the map-making exercises, played a part in the insurgency at all. The formal model of 
the Salvadoran rural insurgency is based on a rational choice model which “...draws 
on the rational actor approach in that individuals decide whether to participate or not 
based on anticipated costs and benefits” (p. 267). The model closes the circle and 
takes the reader back to the beginning, to the collective action problem. But, as Green 
and Shapiro suggest, perhaps Olsonian collective action theory should be tested in 
terms of its “claim that collective incentives do not [matter]”.xiii By focusing on 
individual (moral and emotional) reasons and cost-benefit considerations, Wood’s 
account of the civil war refines collective action theory yet keeps one foot safely in 
the rationalist camp. 
Conclusions 
The rationalist study of civil war has contributed insights into the structural 
determinants of war, chiefly by inferring causal relationships from statistical 
correlations between socio-demographic variables and civil war violence. We now 
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know that “[c]ivil war is more likely to occur in countries that are poor, are subject to 
negative income shocks, have weak state institutions, have sparsely populated 
peripheral regions, and those with mountainous terrain.”xiv This research method, 
however, has a number of limitations, which has been recognized by the civil war 
research community. As argued in this review, this method cannot assist us with 
distinguishing adequately between causes and symptoms, and tends to conceptualise 
civil war as “a series of dichotomized possibilities”, driven by external or internal 
factors, grievance or greed, and rational or irrational actors.”xv In the context of these 
limitations, each of the texts under review represents significant advancements in 
methodological rigor. The sheer scale and ambition underlying each of the projects is 
breathtaking, and while issues have been raised with each of the texts, together they 
deserve the prevalent position they have assumed in the literature. In this sense we 
can only hope that the methodological diversity and theoretical sophistication 
exhibited within these texts can be built upon to continue the quest for understanding 
civil war. In particular, we applaud the explicit and detailed treatment of theory and 
method found within these works, including the authors’ willingness to openly 
discuss weaknesses and limitations of their chosen approach. The field would be well-
served if all civil war scholars were so candid. Their methodological self-awareness 
not only enables us to better assess the validity of their findings, it also fosters an 
open dialogue on ontological and epistemological limitations. If emulated, this 
approach may promote cross-fertilization between micro- and macro-level analyses of 
civil wars, creating new opportunities to advance our understanding of this complex 
social phenomenon.  
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